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Introduction

China's ability to astonish the foreign observer seems to be one constant factor in this society of rapid change. In the 1950s the People's Republic (PRC) pursued a policy of 'lean to one side' and made 'learn from the Soviet Union' the watchword of domestic as well as foreign policy. In the mid-1960s Mao Zedong's so-called Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution unleashed anti-foreign violence against 'British imperialism' and 'Soviet revisionism' alike, with physical as well as rhetorical assaults. In the late 1970s Deng Xiaoping called for a global united front against 'socialist imperialism' to advance the common strategic concern of West Europe, China, Japan and the United States against Soviet expansionism. Now in the 1980s China's leaders explicitly deny that alignment, much less alliance, with any foreign power is possible, instead proclaiming a policy of independence and opposition to superpower hegemony.

It is small wonder that doubts arise abroad over the reliability and durability of pledges that the present 'open door' for foreign trade and investment will not be closed in the future. Indeed the more Deng and his associates insist that these avenues of involvement in the international economic system will continue 'for at least fifty years', the more observers question the degree to which he is trying to convince domestic opponents as well as foreign sceptics.[1]

It is not only the first three decades of extreme swings in PRC foreign policy which caution against taking such projections at face value. Deng himself is 81. His

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protégés, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, respectively head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government, may not work in harness once he leaves the scene. Alternatively, they may face power struggles and policy disputes from opponents presently cowed by Deng's formidable fashioning of coalitions and manipulation of factions. In either case the 'open door' could become subject to vigorous challenge, either as a political ploy against the established leadership or as a legitimate target of attack by those concerned with China's sense of identity and independence.

It is no accident that the overwhelming preponderance of foreign investment in the PRC comes from overseas Chinese, while Japanese, American and European capital remains largely in a 'wait and see' holding pattern.[2] Moreover much capital from these latter sources is in non-producing, quick return ventures such as hotel and tourist facilities. Overseas Chinese can be motivated by patriotism as well as profitability, with an additional side payment in some instances going to their mainland relatives, whether in status, privileges, or monetary benefits.[3] But other sources of private capital must calculate in standard business terms, balancing the potential gains and risks of investing in China against those present elsewhere. Seen from this perspective it is understandable that, except for offshore oil entrepreneurs who are accustomed to high-cost, high-risk ventures, relatively few investments of any real magnitude have as yet emerged from abroad.

To be sure, foreign investors have also been deterred by the inadequate legislation defining rights, privileges, taxes, and protection, much of which only emerged in 1983-84. Implementation of the new laws also requires a testing period. In addition, the full impact of China's economic reforms, the reshuffling and reduction of bureaucratic procedures, and the proper gestation of special economic zones, fourteen coastal city trading areas, and specially designated inner regions necessarily delays the massive infusion of foreign capital.[4]

But beyond these more mundane problems, the basic question plaguing many entrepreneurs otherwise attracted

by the prospect of a market embracing one billion people has remained: will present policy last sufficiently long to make it worth the effort of prolonged negotiations with delayed and uncertain payback? In 1986 China enters its Seventh Five Year Plan. This is an appropriate time to attempt an answer to this question and to assess the degree of regime commitment to dependence on the world economy, euphemistically subsumed under the 'open door' rubric. To what extent is Deng's rhetoric echoed by others? Do the political implications of dependence accord with nationalistic assertions of independence? How far has economic practice moved away from Mao Zedong's insistence on 'self-reliance'? In short, does the available evidence in word and deed justify forecasting either durability for present policy or alternatively its likely demise once Deng leaves the scene?

Admittedly, the foreign forecasting of Chinese political behaviour has a highly uneven record, whether in anticipation of the Sino-Soviet break, the Cultural Revolution, or the rapprochement with Washington. It is small comfort to note that Chinese whose political, and at times physical, lives depended on it also failed to foresee these and other major developments. The fact remains that we are in a somewhat hazardous undertaking when attempting projections beyond the near future of a few years.

Yet the effort is not wholly without reason. Historical recall illuminates how a century-old debate over self-reliance versus dependence provides a long-term perspective against which to compare the relatively short-term period of the 'open door' policy. This period will then be assessed both from the theoretical writings of Chinese economists and by the practical steps taken to implement policy. Finally a forecast will be made of what is probable, as against what is possible, in China's foreign economic relations. This overview from past and present to the future may have greater plausibility than would result from either a simple acceptance of regime rhetoric as all-determining or its outright rejection because of the aforementioned policy oscillations.

One conceptual clarification is necessary. The Western notion of dependencia defines Third World countries as

trapped in the economic exchange with industrialised countries and in the international monetary bind of heavy indebtedness and high interest rates without reliable means of repayment. This goes far beyond anything that China has experienced or is likely to encounter. Instead, dependence, both in Chinese writings and herein, is qualitative rather than quantitative, so that foreign involvement is critical to the accomplishment of stated goals because the impact on China's economic growth would be so severe if, as Moscow did in 1960, the foreigner should terminate the relationship.

The Historic Dilemma

From the Opium War of 1839-41 to the end of World War II spans 'a century of shame and humiliation', so named by both Nationalist and Communist writers. The term connotes a wide range of foreign depredations, such as the granting of extraterritoriality, spheres of influence, territorial annexation, enemy defeat in war, and allied betrayal in victory. Whether in Sun Yat-sen's terms China faced 'being carved up like a melon' or in Mao Zedong's conceptualisation China became 'a semi-colony', the basic question of survival as a country and as a society faced each succeeding regime down to and including the People's Republic established in 1949.

These successive experiences triggered a recurring debate between the proponents of inward versus outward oriented ways to cope with the omnipresent foreign threat. The nativists opposed relying on outside powers to defend China through conventional alliances or to strengthen China through helping it to develop, because such dependence inevitably would benefit the foreigner, not China. Moreover, it ultimately would destroy traditional societal values which had preserved the Middle Kingdom identity through several millenia. Against this point of view was the argument for 'using barbarian against barbarian' while opening up to the world so as to combine 'Chinese spirit, foreign way'.

After a brief heyday the outward looking reformers lost out to the inner oriented conservatives, dramatically manifest in the anti-foreign actions of the Boxers. But the dilemma of having to choose between self-reliance with its attendant weakness, and dependence with the accompanying foreign influence, if not dominance, persisted. Sinocentrism was the heritage of 3,000 years of continuous civilisation that saw itself as surviving because it was superior to all others. The values and mores that, at least in idealised form, epitomised this superiority seemed antithetical to and threatened by those inherent in foreign capitalism. Chiang Kai-shek's China Destiny put it most extremely in blaming the 'unequal treaties' for having 'completely destroyed our nationhood, and our sense of honor and shame was lost ... The traditional structure of the family, the village, and the community was disrupted. The virtue of mutual help was replaced by competition and jealousy.'[5]

To compound the dilemma, modern nationalism emerged in China with a strong anti-foreign component in reaction to the blatant imperialism of the nineteenth century and the more veiled legalistic twentieth century variety.[6] China's perceived sell-out at the 1919 Paris Conference led to a wave of public opposition, subsequently known as the May Fourth Movement, which initiated a decade of boycotts, strikes and demonstrations specifically aimed at British, Japanese, and other foreign concessions. Yet there was no way that Republican China could amass the capital for investment, acquire the weapons for defence, or confront another power without foreign help.

The communist avowal of 'proletarian internationalism' did not end the nationalistic striving for a unique Chinese identity with its implicit anti-foreign thrust. Thus Anna Louise Strong learned in post-war Yan'an that Mao Zedong had 'created a Chinese Marxism' because until then Marxism had been a European phenomenon.[7] Zhou Enlai and his colleagues told American diplomats that while being Marxist meant leaning to one side, it did not mean agreeing with all Soviet policy. Moreover, how far one leaned would depend on US behaviour.[8]

To be sure, if Stalin required such sentiments to be muted in order to gain his military support against a perceived American threat and his economic assistance to rebuild a shattered China, Peking could accommodate him. If Khrushchev could be cajoled into returning concessions in Xinjiang and the north-east by a 'learn from the Soviet Union' campaign, that too could be arranged. And if winning nuclear weapons assistance from Moscow was facilitated by calling upon the 'socialist camp' to recognise that there had to be a single head and declaring that 'East Wind prevails over West Wind' on the basis of Sputnik, Mao could so oblige.[9]

However, in 1958, Mao 'decided to make self-reliance our major policy and striving for foreign aid a secondary aim'.[10] Whether it was a question of domestic economic policy on communes and the Great Leap Forward or of foreign policy in testing the US-Chiang tie through bombardment of Quemoy, he would no longer bow to the dictates of dependence on the Soviet Union. Not only was Mao determined to do things his way but he was willing to provoke the withdrawal of all Soviet aid, human, financial and material, in order to pursue an independent course.

Much research remains to be done on the inner workings of the Sino-Soviet relationship during the 1950s. However there are suggestive similarities in the experience of Peking with Moscow, at least as articulated by Mao in his then unpublished statements, and the experience of Peking with various foreign powers a century or so earlier. For example, Mao suspected Khrushchev of selling out to Eisenhower on Taiwan during the celebrated 1959 Camp David summit, which was followed by Moscow's public neutrality after Sino-Indian border clashes that autumn. This recalls Li Hongzhang's failure to cement Russian support against Japan sufficiently to preclude their collusion in carving up north-east China during the first decade of this century.

Yet galling as were these experiences, real or perceived, they raised the same dilemma as the previous century: how could China overcome military and economic weakness without foreign assistance? On the other hand,

what was the price to be paid - in societal as well as in political and economic terms - for continued dependence? Mao resolved the dilemma by challenging Khrushchev to the near dissolution of the alliance in 1960.

But this was only a harbinger of the more extreme isolationist line of 'self-reliance' that was to explode in anti-foreign behaviour during the Cultural Revolution. Not only in Peking but around China's borders and in PRC embassies abroad, Red Guards shouted and stormed their way in open defiance of diplomatic relations. As they ransacked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking, one official who cautioned against dumping secret files out the window evoked the rejoinder, 'What's so special about secrets anyway?'[11]

Following the burning of the British Chancery in August 1967, Zhou Enlai personally apologised to London and limited further anti-foreign violence. On the southern border, secret negotiations between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the British military command agreed on mutual measures to stop Canton militants seeking to infiltrate Hong Kong for 'the liberation of our brothers and sisters from the British fascists'. By 1968 the worst had passed. Mao finally gave in to the PLA which considered that China was threatened by anarchy and civil war. Martial law packed the Red Guards off to the countryside, to prison, and in some instances, to execution.

Although China returned its ambassadors to embassies whence they had been totally withdrawn except for Cairo, the tension between nativist isolationists and foreign dependence modernisers remained. After a spurt of contracts for the importation of complete plants and sets of equipment in the early 1970s, the subsequently dubbed 'Gang of Four' attacked the selling of China's resources, mainly coal and oil, for the benefit of foreign capitalists, mainly Japanese. They also attacked Zhou Enlai through thinly veiled historical allegories that accused him of betraying Mao as well as China.[12]

Thus an American world affairs delegation discovered 'self-reliance' to be the insistent watchword during its visit to China in late 1975.[13] A high official assured his

astonished audience that China 'will never seek to make money from tourism because we will view foreign visitors as our guests'. Maoist aphorisms, such as 'the world is in turmoil, the situation is excellent', keynoted the monologue advanced by the Chinese side, which assiduously avoided engaging the prestigious Americans in a rational exchange and discussion of world affairs and China's relationship thereto.

But within a year Mao died and the 'Gang of Four' fell. Momentous political developments were already under way that would restore Deng Xiaoping to power with both domestic and foreign policies aimed at resolving, once and for all, the debate between self-reliance and dependence in favour of the latter.

The 'Open Door' Policy

The American Secretary of State, John Hay, could never have imagined that his doctrine of 'the open door' for China would re-emerge decades later in a fresh guise; much less that it would become the watchword for Chinese foreign policy. His goal was to win agreement from the other imperialist powers that no spheres of influence would exclude American capital from China. Despite his having proclaimed success, nothing changed. Various powers preserved their existing domains of dominance and, in the case of Russia and Japan, further consolidated them subsequently in north-east China by secret agreement.[14]

In 1963, Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, Roger Hilsman, resurrected the term with a new twist. In the first major official address on US China policy since the 'containment' days of John Foster Dulles, Hilsman called attention to Washington's posture of 'firmness with flexibility', pledging that 'we are determined to keep the door open' to change in Peking so that a subsequent generation of leadership might find normalisation of relations with the US both prudent and profitable.[15]

It remained for Deng Xiaoping, however, to turn Hay on his head, promoting the 'open door' at home and abroad as essential to China's determination to develop a modern

economy and a rising standard of living through the importation of foreign capital, technology, and advice. In a remarkable revision of history as ritualistically reiterated for nearly a century, Deng directly addressed inward versus outward oriented policy. Speaking in October 1984 to the Central Advisory Commission, a prestigious if relatively powerless body of superannuated party veterans, he declared:

> Any country that closes its door to the outside world cannot achieve progress. We underwent this bitter experience and so did our forefathers. The Ming Dynasty's Yongle emperor would be considered an 'open' emperor in dispatching Zheng He to embark on an ocean voyage to the West. After the emperor died the Ming Dynasty gradually declined and China was invaded by foreigners. Kangxi and Qianlong of the Qing Dynasty could not be called ' open' emperors. China closed the country to international intercourse for more than three centuries from the middle of the Ming Dynasty to the Opium War, or for nearly two centuries from emperors Kangxi and Qianlong. Hence the country became impoverished, backward, and ignorant.[16] [Emphasis added]

Deng's definition of when and why the Middle Kingdom decayed to the point of collapse contrasted sharply with the standard litany of blame levied on foreign imperialism by communist and non-communist alike. Then in another reversal of rhetoric he moved to the recent past. 'In the First Five Year Plan after the founding of the People's Republic of China, we opened the country to the outside world but only to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Later on, we closed the door and we did not make any progress.'

This capsule history of the 1950s is striking in two regards. First, Deng made no mention of the United States' embargo on trade with China that not only excluded all American commerce but also interfered drastically with third

country trade. Instead he asserted that it was China which had 'opened ... only to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe'. Deng's failure to recount the facts contrasted with his assertion in 1978 that 'while Comrade Mao was still living ... we wanted to develop economic and trade relations with certain capitalist countries and even to absorb foreign capital and undertake joint ventures. But ... at the time an embargo was being imposed on China.'[17] His earlier statement pointedly had sought to implicate Mao in Deng's newly emerging policy on joint ventures, while not claiming the chairman's explicit endorsement. Equally interesting is his failure to recall how Stalin forced Sino-Soviet joint ventures on the PRC in 1950 and how Khrushchev ended them in 1954 as a gesture of better relations.[18]

This raises a second aspect of the 1984 speech. By omitting any reference to the Soviet withdrawal of all advisers and technical assistance in 1960, Deng lifted the onus from Khrushchev for bringing to a sudden and costly end a decade of economic dependence. Thus his handling of past American and Soviet policy signalled a readiness to let bygones be bygone while self-critically blaming Peking for these externally imposed obstacles to modernisation. Deng's elliptical allusion to China having 'closed the door' in the 1960s presumably referred to the Cultural Revolution, paralleling his 1978 accusation that 'the Gang of Four ... sealed China off from the outside world'.

Having rewritten the previously accepted Chinese version of these events, Deng then took unnamed opponents directly to task:

> We must open to the outside world and the open policy will not hurt us ... Some of our comrades are afraid that evil practices may be introduced in the country. They are most worried about whether we will become capitalist. Perhaps, some of our veteran comrades have this worry. They are afraid of seeing capitalism suddenly looming up after having worked all their lives for

> socialism and communism, and they cannot stand such a sight.
>
> No, nothing will be affected. It may bring some negative factors. But it will not be difficult to overcome such factors if we are aware of them. If we closed the country to international intercourse, even another 50 years would definitely make it impossible to come close to the level of the economically developed countries. When we are close to the level of the economically developed countries with an annual income of several thousand dollars per capita, a new bourgeois class will not emerge because all the basic means will still be owned by the state and the public. [Emphasis added]

Deng did not move to so clear and uncompromising a statement of his views until he had prepared the political ground by: purging the top party ranks of vestigial Maoist 'leftist' influences and laying the basis for a coalition of vested interests whose potential future rested with the new policy of dependence. Significantly, his Selected Works, 1975-1982, issued with great fanfare in 1983, contained relatively little on foreign policy, foreign trade, and foreign participation in the vaunted 'four modernisations'.[19]

By late 1984, however, Deng's position was secure enough for him to state the case without reservation. His speech won mass distribution throughout the country via the media and separate publication on 31 December 1984, thereby setting the tone for the new year. Moreover, it anticipated formulation of the Seventh Five Year Plan in 1985-86, pre-empting any attempt to resurrect the hoary myths of foreign domination and foreign corruption as a counter to the economic advantages of foreign dependence. It is in this regard that his rewriting of standard history as promulgated in China deserves special attention.

The Politics of Dependence

Yet after more than a century of recurring debate over foreign dependence and its impact on Chinese society,

marked by intermittent outbursts of xenophobic behaviour, one cannot assume that simply because Mao is dead and Deng is in charge, the debate has ended. For one thing, a population as large and varied as China does not change attitudes on so emotional an issue overnight.[20] Moreover not all signals from the centre have been uniform and consistent on the matter since Mao's death.

During the 'spiritual pollution' campaign of 1983-84, for example, attacks on 'bourgeois corruption' fell short of nativist isolationism but their implication of contamination resulting from foreign contact inhibited relations between Chinese and 'foreign experts' in various ways.[21] One American reported being treated 'as though I had herpes of the breath'. In mid-1984 another was accused by a young Chinese in his unit of being a 'foreign spy, otherwise why would you be here?'[22] Such instances are neither universal nor constant as numerous contrary accounts testify. However their occurrence illustrates the need for consistency in policy over time to achieve complete acceptance of the 'open door' in all of its manifestations.

Throughout 1984, acknowledgement of resistance, if not open opposition, continued to crop up in writings advocating Deng's programme. Thus one article noted: 'For a long time, our country has been closed off and sealed in and therefore we lack an understanding of new international situations. Since implementing the open policy, many comrades still have an insufficient understanding of the strategic significance of introducing foreign funds.'[23] Against this view the writer argued: 'An important trend in the development of a world economy since World War II is that production and capital have become increasingly internationalised and the degree of interdependence among countries has increased. Therefore implementing an economy open to foreign countries and developing foreign economic and trade relations are state policies common to all countries at present.'

Another author addressed the question of joint ventures, refuting various points of contention. 'Some people' say these are 'foreign enterprises' but this is wrong because they exist under China's legal jurisdiction.[24] 'Some'

call them 'capitalist enterprises' but there are no private investors on the PRC side. Others deny that joint ventures can operate in a planned economy, but the author considered that the mixture of market and plan facilitated them. As a final riposte to those who fear that joint ventures threaten the eventual introduction of communism, he responded: 'We believe international co-operation will exist for a long time ... After socialism is built and when the time comes to transfer to communism, we will still need the open door policy. All countries and nationalities depend on each other' in the world market.

Foreign loans raise a host of contentious issues, some economic and some historical. As one writer noted, 'At the mention of foreign loans some comrades tend to evince concern over the heavy burden imposed by debts.'[25] More seriously, perhaps, 'There are other comrades who fear that the use of large amounts of borrowed money from foreign governments might put the nation under the control of foreign powers as it was in the old days.' He cited the 'gunboat policy to break open the door which closed old China from the outside world', and recalled how 'the Western capitalist countries pressured those in power at the time into signing a series of unequal treaties by which they proceeded to export into China their surplus capital in order to gain control of the economic lifeline of the old China'. However, 'they are in essence different from the use of foreign capital for the socialist projects of economic construction in which we are now engaged ... Today ours is an entirely independent sovereign state.'

It is impossible to infer from such scattered references what degree of opposition exists, much less where it is located and with what political potential. Suffice to say that the repeated counterarguments to plausible attacks suggest continued resistance to various aspects of the 'open door', and in particular to foreign loans and joint ventures. Further, where such criticism is not specifically cited, the vigour with which Deng's programme is promoted may reflect a felt need to persuade a doubtful audience. Thus a lengthy discussion of China's electronics industry began with the assertion:

> In the world's new technological revolution, the rapid development of electronics technology is bringing with it a new and developing industry and is vigorously making a run at the electronics industry of all nations ... The field of international trade is the first to be affected by this; thus we must give this problem our full attention, resolutely implement the CPC Central Committee open door policy, place ourselves in the international division of labour of the electronics industry, closely integrate the development of our own electronics industry with international trade, use new technical achievements, vigorously develop the electronics industry, and promote development of the 'four modernisations'.[26] [Emphasis added]

The author compared the high import rates for electronics of the United States, West Germany and Japan with the low rate for China, concluding:

> This ... is mainly caused by the country being closed off to international intercourse and cut off from the world for a long time. Premier Zhou Enlai criticised the 'traditional conservatism' of the electronics industry. It was deeply affected by 'leftist' ideology and it stopped the entry of imports in the name of 'self-reliance', 'national production', and 'safeguarding the national industry'.

However, the recent designation of fourteen coastal ports for export production 'was a new turning point in the history of China's foreign economic and trade relations and terminated China's long-standing seclusion. [Emphasis added]

This analysis proceeded to recall an old saying: 'China has a large population, vast land and large market so ... we do not have to rely on the international market.' But this was 'small-scale peasant economic ideology'. Calling for a 'Silicon Valley-style base in coastal ports registered for

export', the writer concluded, 'We must actively seek investment from abroad for jointly run enterprises ... China not only needs to import foreign capital but also must go abroad to develop joint venture trade ... By paying attention to developing the markets of the Third World, we can shake off the competition of the developed nations for our electronics products.'

The implied sideswipe at 'self-reliance' goes further than most articles which at least pay lip-service to this as an ultimate goal, albeit with so slight a passing reference as to suggest that it is more rhetorical than real. An apparent exception, notable in its greater attention to the subject, declared: 'We must never again close the country to international intercourse and oppose the import of foreign advanced technology, upholding the principle of starting everything from the beginning. But we should definitely guard against one tendency, namely, worshipping and having blind faith in things foreign, underestimating our own capabilities and giving up the path of self-development.'[27] He further asserted that 'We should take the initiative to introduce technology to enhance our own capability of technological innovation. Such a practice conforms with the principle of self-reliance.' He then cited the example of Japan which 'spent $5.8 billion to import a total of 26,000 technical items in twenty-six years, 1950 to 1975 ... There is much in the Japanese experience that we can make use of.' Thus his final analysis advanced a notable case of dependence as the best means for development.

The 'Open Door' in Practice

Advocacy and argumentation alone do not necessarily guarantee survival of the'open door', therefore political developments deserve attention in assessing its durability. First and foremost, the long heralded review of CCP membership files in order to root out 'leftists, smashers, and power grabbers' offers a powerful means of either inducing compliance or eliminating opposition. Secondly, the steady expansion of foreign trade, joint ventures, and

co-operative enterprises involving foreign investment and technical advice creates new vested interests for dependence as against self-reliance.

Export Commodity Production Bases (ECPB), first tried in the early 1970s, expanded rapidly by the early 1980s.[28] Concentrated in the coastal areas, they now comprise 100 single-commodity agricultural units, 94 specialised industrial bases (factories and mines), 30 comprehensive production bases, and 821 processing bases, in addition to 130 joint enterprises linking government industrial or agricultural departments with foreign trade corporations. Altogether the ECPBs earned an estimated 22 per cent of the total foreign exchange received in 1981, and 30 per cent in 1982, with three-fourths coming from the comprehensive production bases located in fourteen provinces.

This focus on the coastal area also characterised the four highly touted Special Economic Zones (SEZ), although their success has yet to be determined.[29] More important, in early 1984 fourteen coastal cities and Hainan were opened up to foreign investment with privileges similar to but different from the SEZs. Following protests from the interior, the regime named another thirty cities, twenty-four of which were inland, with special foreign exchange access and direct negotiations with foreign investors to be approved by Peking without provincial level intervention.[30] Thus every province now has at least one city, often the capital, able to contract joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises, entirely on its own within specified limits which, in some cases, can reach $30 million. In mid-1985, restrictions on the use of foreign exchange postponed implementation of these programmes. However they remain on the books as targets for tomorrow, if not today.

While many of these locations will be producing for the domestic market, the political importance of their joining the SEZs and coastal cities in competing for foreign investment and trade should not be underestimated. The image of foreign capitalism profiting from cheap labour in specially favoured enclaves along China's seaboard hearkened back suggestively to the 'century of shame and humiliation',

although extra-territoriality and foreign gunboats no longer violate Chinese sovereignty. This negative image could be readily attacked by the remaining areas where unemployment and productivity would fall far behind. But by greatly expanding the opportunity to compete for foreign investment, even though experience, infrastructure and location still significantly advantage coastal cities, Deng has laid the basis for a nation-wide network to support the 'open door' against any nativist opposition. The extent of this network is suggested by the identification of more than 3,000 projects approved for foreign investment, ranging from agricultural production and electronics to textiles and transportation.[31]

In addition, the web of foreign involvement in economic modernisation enmeshes numerous activities. Between 1979 and 1985, $17.3 billion in foreign funds had entered China, of which 4 billion was in direct investment tied to more than 900 joint ventures, 2,000 co-operative ventures, 31 joint development enterprises, 74 foreign-owned enterprises and 1,300 compensation trade projects.[32] In 1984 alone, more than 700 new joint ventures linked Chinese and foreign investment, 3.5 times the total number previously contracted for and 2.2 times the earlier total investment. During the first half of 1985, 687 joint venture contracts were signed, quadruple the same period the previous year. More than $3 billion was committed, of which half was already in use by mid-year, and of this latter portion, $820 million came through loans from international governmental organisations and foreign governments.[33] Although the greater part of such funds and activity continued to come from Hong Kong and overseas Chinese, the proportion of Japanese and other foreign involvement increased in 1984 and is expected to accelerate in growth as new legislation provides an improved environment.

In this regard it is worth noting that twenty-three Japanese banks and five insurance companies have established fifty representative offices in China while the Bank of China has business relations with fifty-six Japanese banks.[34] During 1979-84, Tokyo granted $1.2 billion in low interest loans while the Export-Import Bank of Japan

provided $1.68 billion for a total of nearly $2.9 billion. The Japanese government has agreed to another $1.9 billion loan for 1985-90, the Export-Import Bank is committed to an additional $2.32 billion, and a syndicate of sixty-seven Japanese banks is offering another $2 billion. The total of more than $6 billion in potential Japanese loans exceeds China's total debt as of mid-1985 by $2 billion, although it falls well within the safe range of 20 per cent of annual foreign exchange earnings anticipated during the Seventh Five Year Plan.

This linkage of loans, investment, industrial productivity, technology transfer and foreign trade is part of an organic whole: economic modernisation. Japan's role is primary in this process, compared with other countries. This explains why Peking touts 'Sino-Japanese friendship in the 21st century' as a major propaganda theme for internal as well as external audiences. Hu Yaobang's personal identification with this theme, reciprocally endorsed by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, gives it special significance as authorised as the highest level.

Japan provides the most difficult and dramatic test of dependence on a foreign source of trade, capital and technology, given its stormy and at times bloody relationship with China over nearly seventy-five years. It is impossible to bury the bitterness felt by many older generation mainlanders whose years of suffering and personal loss during the Japanese invasion continue to colour their feelings about reliance on a past enemy for future growth. Pointed and painful reminders of that experience appear in mainland media from time to time as express warnings 'against the possible return of Japanese militarism'.[35]

Yet on the whole the recent record is relatively free from friction between these two entirely different economic and political systems. The most celebrated case of controversy, the Baoshan steel complex, came at a sufficiently early stage in the new relationship for the immediate bitter recriminations on both sides to serve as a valuable learning experience. Its renegotiation and gradual

realisation demonstrated a mutual willingness to compromise for the sake of the larger symbiotic interest.[36]

The Likely Prospects

The rapid evolution of post-Mao China from the Cultural Revolution turmoil of only a decade ago requires the constant updating of information with a consequent adjustment of perspective. But the trend has been consistent overall, despite momentary fluctuations and retreats. Deng Xiaoping's way has won out, time and again, despite all the odds and obstacles arraigned against it, not the least of which was the extent to which it implicitly or explicitly reversed the course left by Mao Zedong as founding father of the PRC.

To say that Deng's political shrewdness has been crucial is not to predict that his achievement will disappear with his own demise. On the contrary, Deng's careful fashioning of a coalition whose interest lies in advancing and preserving his policy, given sufficient time to take root and solidify, is a testimonial both to his survival tactics and his future vision. Thus with each successive year of power he has added an indeterminable additional period of policy longevity, all other things being equal.

Unfortunately other things seldom remain equal. First and foremost, there are the economic consequences of Deng's policies that will remain uncertain for some time to come. If too much is expected too soon, impatient and exaggerated hopes can backlash on the leadership and be exploited by an opportunistic opposition. The sheer magnitude of the reforms, the scale of population and territory to be served, and the human obstacles of bureaucracy, backwardness and behaviour will bring setbacks of varying degree at one point or another. Some problems are already visible; others will follow. Natural disasters, whether floods, earthquakes or typhoons, can wreak havoc with high-cost projects. The vicissitudes of the international economy will have an increasing impact on China's internal development with exports vulnerable to protectionism and imports to price fluctuations.

How and where the blame will fall under conditions of perceived shortfall or outright failure cannot be forecast with confidence. But foreign involvement and dependence will remain an inviting scapegoat, justified or not. This is particularly true for Japan, and to a lesser extent the United States, assuming that the Taiwan problem remains unresolved. This backlash, in turn, can cause foreign investors to draw back or at least slow down the growth of their involvement, thereby affecting the overall policy.

Reference to Taiwan raises the potential linkage between foreign and domestic politics as they affect the 'open door' policy. In 1983 Deng Liqun, then head of the Propaganda Department of the CCP, delivered a major address on 'patriotic education' which made patriotism, aiguozhuyi, a virtual substitute for Marxism-Leninism in historical writings and teaching.[37] Although 'there are some people in China who have, in fact, still not accepted communism, however with regard to patriotism, the majority of people, including those who have still not accepted communism, can have a common language ... Therefore we can enlist support from a majority of the masses provided we proceed from patriotism.' This would lead 'from patriotism, to communism, the common road taken by all the advanced elements of modern China in the past and also a road for them to follow at present and in the future'. Thus the patriot of today will be the communist of tomorrow, according to Deng Liqun.

But patriotism may be a passive affirmation of loyalty bonding a populace or it may be an active assertion of nationalism with binding obligations. The latter aspect is of special importance where foreign insult or injury enflames political passions or is exploited toward that end. Deng Liqun specified, 'From now to the end of this century, the historical meaning of patriotism should be the three great tasks put forward by Comrade Deng Xiaoping. Of the three great tasks, loving the motherland and socialism have a close and inseparable relationship in socialist society. The unification of the motherland is still a pending task.' Thus the first two tasks exemplify passive affirmation while the third, Taiwan, poses an actionable goal.

Deng's directive to educators and scholars reflected the expression of assertive nationalism which surfaced in 1982, in reaction to such provocations as Tokyo's proposed softening of textbook terminology for Japan's past aggressions, the defection of a celebrated tennis player to the United States, the controversy over American arms sales to Taiwan, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's public discussion of Hong Kong's future on the basis of 'three international treaties'.[38]

To be sure, these matters all were eventually resolved in one fashion or another without serious injury to any of the external relationships. But the immediate Chinese responses thereto revealed a possible threat to foreign dependence should similar matters arise in the future. Deng Xiaoping put it bluntly to the Twelfth CCP Congress in September 1982:

> Independence and self-reliance have always been and will forever be our basic stand. We Chinese people value our friendship and co-operation with other countries and peoples. We value even more our hard-won independence and sovereign rights. No foreign country can expect China to be its vassal or expect it to swallow any bitter fruit detrimental to its own interests.[39] [Emphasis added]

Hu Yaobang's assertion made the historical reference explicit: 'Having suffered aggression and oppression for over a century, the Chinese people will never again allow themselves to be humiliated as before.'[40] His words underscored Deng's response to a question on Hong Kong, 'If I agree to prolong the lease, I will become the second Li Hongzhang.'[41]

Such forceful declarations were not standard before 1982, hearkening back instead to postures struck at the inception of the PRC when Mao asserted that the Chinese people had at last 'stood up!' The context within which Deng and Hu spoke illustrates how issues such as Taiwan and Hong Kong can arouse nationalistic sensitivities which may either invite opposition to compromise or unite the

country on a patriotic basis with implicit or explicit anti-foreign overtones.

These domestic potentialities of aiguozhuyi can have an impact on dependence when a problem brings the two policies into confrontation. Looking ahead, it is possible to envisage a political crisis on Taiwan with the passing of Chiang Ching-kuo's rule, with or without action on behalf of Taiwan independence. Depending on circumstances at the time, Peking's avowed readiness to blockade the island or to intervene forcibly would be tested against Washington's professed opposition to the use of force against Taiwan.[42] While the United States almost certainly would not respond militarily, economic sanctions could result, to the detriment of Sino-American trade and technology interaction.

The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Tai) are so miniscule in size and importance as not to be worth including on any political or physical map. However, they symbolise the larger Sino-Japanese conflict of claims to the continental shelf with its as yet unproven but presumed vast reserves of offshore oil. China has already protested against joint Korean-Japanese exploration of the area adjacent to the two countries as violating PRC sovereignty, although it has not followed up its protests with action. Conceivably at some future time the question of either asserting its claim or compromising it on the median line could confront Peking with a choice that in turn would affect Sino-Japanese economic co-operation.

Less volatile, but nonetheless potentially provocative of nationalistic sensitivities, might be increased protectionist measures taken against Chinese exports to the United States. In 1983 acrimony over this question prompted Peking to violate its agreement for grain purchases, in addition suspending the import of American soybeans and chemical fibres. Both sides managed to contain the controversy so as to permit summit visits to be exchanged in 1984. Nevertheless it illustrated the impact trade disputes can have on the wider relationship.

Of these three possible areas of contention, Taiwan remains the least predictable and most volatile, depending

as it does on what happens when Chiang dies. There is no reason to think that the continental shelf, protectionism or other matters will become sufficiently serious in Peking politics to jeopardise the role of the United States or Japan in China's economic modernisation so long as Deng is alive and active. He has already addressed these issues so as to prevail over whatever opposition existed, compromising or postponing them for the sake of the immediate priority: foreign participation and assistance in PRC growth and development.

Whether his passing from power will make such tactics less successful could conceivably depend on whether Hu and Zhao co-operate or compete. A genuine duumvirate of equals is a rare and usually short-lived phenomenon in communist systems. It is virtually unheard of in Chinese history. Both precedents augur poorly for Deng's two proteges to act in harmony once he leaves the scene.

But this logic conflicts with the fact that both Hu and Zhao have had bitter experience with the perils of one-man rule. The memory of Mao may restrain that human ambition which universally motivates political figures to fight for the top position, particularly in an authoritarian system where the resultant power is so disproportionate to that of all other individuals.

Even should friction or competition emerge between Hu and Zhao, it is unlikely to renew the old debate between self-reliance and foreign dependence. Both men are deeply and publicly committed to Deng's policy in general, and Hu to its Japanese component in particular. Neither could credibly criticise the present course as ill-founded, much less as a betrayal of national or communist interests.

Without leadership at the very top, there is little chance of a lesser figure or faction successfully exploiting the issues to challenge a Hu-Zhao duumvirate in combination with the coalition of vested interests supporting foreign dependence. True, potential groundswell of reaction against the policy exists in the countryside and among conservative urban circles, all appalled at the degree to which 'un-Chinese' and corrupt lifestyles permeate the coastal cities, especially among the youth. The 'socialist

pollution' campaign probably reflected widespread concern over practices associated with foreign influences, a concern in consonance with much that is traditional in Chinese culture.

Indeed, seen in the broadest and longest perspective, the Deng-Hu-Zhao programme of foreign dependence may be rational but it is not natural to China. The argument over national identity and independence versus foreign values and dependence is a familiar one for newly developing nations. But it has deeper roots in the Middle Kingdom than in any other Third World country.

This puts a premium on economic success, at least as measured in incremental terms whereby present experience compares favourably with past memory, if not in cumulative terms compared with other societies. Rather than Mao's 1958 slogan of 'overtake Britain in the production of steel', Deng's call to 'quadruple output by the year 2000' with an attendant per capital annual income of $1,000 is safer politically, whatever its feasibility. So long as life today is better than yesterday, dissatisfaction can be contained within manageable limits.

Certainly, as of 1985, Deng's programmes appear to float on a rising tide of public approval based on improving standards of living, expanding employment, and opening opportunities for personal advancement. The distribution of profit and power is unequal but sufficiently broad to win support across different economic sectors, geographic regions and social strata. While the dramatic rate of growth in 1980-85 cannot be expected to continue, nor indeed do the planners intend it to, the likelihood of visible growth seems assured for at least the next five years and probably through the following decade.

Admittedly, similar expectations were held by many in China and abroad thirty years ago. As against the economic and political chaos inherited by the new regime in 1949, by 1955 all doubt had disappeared from those of us who watched from Hong Kong and wondered how far, how fast would the economy grow. No speculation seemed sillier than the notion of India and China being in a race to provide the better model for emulation in what was then

termed the underdeveloped world. It seemed obvious that there was no such race: China had already won.

No one could foresee that Mao and his colleagues would experiment so radically and disastrously in the Great Leap Forward. Few could anticipate Peking provoking Moscow to the point of total economic separation. And even Mao's closest comrades - except for the Gang of Four - were caught by surprise at the full extent of his Cultural Revolution and the destruction it wreaked on the political and economic systems that had evolved over the previous two decades.

These are sobering reminders that euphoric predictions of human behaviour in China, as elsewhere, are subject to the simple truism: human behaviour is unpredictable. But forecasts are cast as probabilities and not made in absolute terms. Therefore I conclude with a forecast: China's door will almost certainly remain open after the passing of Deng Xiaoping, probably through the 1990s. Indeed, it is likely to open wider with time. The present preoccupation with balancing trade annually should gradually give way to large loans for imports that directly or indirectly facilitate repayment through future exports.[43] The gradual opening of cities throughout China for direct foreign investment may result in a proliferation of multinational presence leaping over the traditional coastal enclaves.[44] Bolder visions may be realised, tying the PRC into regional capital as well as trade patterns that depend on the multilateral clearing of accounts.

Admittedly 'worst case' scenarios can be devised to identify political and economic variables whose interaction might arouse anti-foreign impulses and a return to self-reliance. In any event there will be resistance to further opening the door where it threatens the Chinese sense of control over the allocation of values and resources. But in the final analysis, such concerns do not outweigh the probability of the People's Republic remaining on its present course.

NOTES

1. The US Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost 'Despite repeated assurances from top Chinese leaders that the "open door" policy is long-term, many investors obviously are taking a wait-and-see attitude.' Asian Wall Street Journal (hereafter AWSJ), 4 June 1985.

2. David Bonavia, 'Investing in the Old Country', Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 12 November 1984.

3. Ian Buruma, 'Call of the Motherland', ibid.

4. Kawai Hiroko, 'China's Open-Door Policy in High Gear', China Newsletter, No.53, November-December 1984, reviews the positive and negative aspects of foreign investment in the PRC.

5. Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny (New York: Roy Publishers, 1947), pp.79, 88.

6. Kuang-sheng Liao, Antiforeignism and Modernization in China: 1860-1980 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984) provides an historical overview with empirical research for the most recent period.

7. Anna Louise Strong, Dawn out of China (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1948), p.29. Liu Shaoqi told her, 'Mao Zedong has created a Chinese or Asiatic form of Marxism. His great accomplishment is to change Marxism from its European to its Asiatic form. He is the first who has succeeded in doing so.'

8. Interview with John F. Melby, member of the Marshall Mission to China, 1945-46.

9. Reconstruction of the Khrushchev-Mao negotiations for Soviet nuclear weapons assistance may be found in the author's contribution on Chinese foreign policy, 1958-64, in the Cambridge Modern History of China, 1949-75 (forthcoming).

10. Mao made this statement retrospectively in 1962: see 'Talk at an Enlarged Central Work Conference', 30 January 1962, in Stuart Schram (ed.), Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed,

Talks and Letters, 1956-71 (England: Penguin Books, 1974), p.178.

11. This paragraph and the next draw on the author's personal knowledge while US Deputy Consul General, Hong Kong, 1966-68. See also Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), ch.22. Rice was Consul General in Hong Kong until late 1967.

12. Allen S. Whiting, Chinese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the 1970s (Ann Arbor: Michigan Papers on Chinese Studies, 1979), recounts the attack which was mounted mainly through allegorical articles, ostensibly of historical relevance only.

13. The author accompanied the delegation which was headed by Cyrus Vance and included the top officers from the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, the Rockefeller Foundation, the United Nations Association, and others.

14. Alfred Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939), ch.2. Actually the 'open door' concept was British in origin and promoted by William W. Rockhill as adviser to Secretary of State John Hay.

15. The author drafted the portion referring to 'the door open'; see also Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967); for the author's role in backgrounding the press and its favourable treatment of the speech, see p.355. Hilsman said, 'We pursue towards Communist China a policy of the Open Door: we are determined to keep the door open to the possibility of change, and not to slam it shut against any development which might advance our own national good, serve the free world, and benefit the people of China.' ibid, p.352.

16. Deng Xiaoping to Third Plenary Session of Central Advisory Committee, 22 October 1984, Renmin ribao [People's Daily], 1 January 1985. For a slightly amended version, see Beijing Review, Vol.33, Nos.7-8, 18 February 1985.

17. 'Hold High the Banner of Mao Zedong Thought and Adhere to the Principle of Seeking Truth from Facts', 16 September 1978, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, (1975-1982) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), p.142.

18. The February 1950 agreements established two joint Sino-Soviet companies in Xinjiang for non-ferrous and rare metals processing, and for petroleum exploitation; a third for civil airlines between the two countries through the North-east, Mongolia, and Central Asia; and a fourth for shipbuilding in Dalian. In October 1954 they were terminated, with China to repay the USSR through exports 'over the course of several years'.

19. In addition to the previously cited statement see also 'The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us', 16 January 1980, p.247 and 'Answers to the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci', 21 and 23 August 1980, pp.332-333. These few references occur in a volume of 418 pages.

20. Steve Thorp et. al., 'Teaching in China: What We Give, What We Get', Asian Survey, Vol.23, No.11, November 1983, offers the varied experiences of five Americans during the years 1979-81. Their testimony and that of others available to the author challenge the flat generalisation that foreign experts are handled 'at a distance in a display of quiet reserve, mixed with a good dose of half-concealed but well-contained aggressiveness', in 'China Among the Nations', China News Analysis, No.1258, 9 April 1984.

21. Thomas B. Gold, '"Just in Time", China Battles Spiritual Pollution on the Eve of 1984', Asian Survey, Vol.24, No.9, September 1984, reviews the movement and its demise.

22. Both situations were recounted to the author directly.

23. Shao Wangyu, 'Actively Set Up Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures, Promote Development of Foreign Economic Trade', Guoji maoyi [International trade], No.6, 27 June 1984.

24. Chu Baotai, 'Several Theoretical and Policy Issues Concerning the Establishment of Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures', Guoji maoyi wenti [Issues in international trade], No.5, 1983, in Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS) CEA-84-012, pp.110-115.

25. Liu Xiangdong and Liu Jialin, 'Debt Problems Arising from the Utilization of Foreign Loans', Buoji maoyi, No.6, 27 June 1984.

26. Ge Zhangyi and Ge Bing, 'A Discussion of the Countermeasures of the World's New Technological Revolution and the Foreign Trade of China's Electronics Industry', Buoji maoyi wenti, No.5, September-October 1984.

27. Zhu Rongji, 'A Few Issues Concerning the Work of Introducing Technology from Abroad', Jingji ribao [Economics daily], 29 October 1984 in JPRS-CEA-84-101, pp.74-85. Zhu was a vice-minister in the State Economic Commission at the time.

28. Tom Engle, 'China's Export Production Bases', China Business Review, Vol.11, No.6, November-December 1984.

29. George T. Crane, 'Whither the Special Economic Zones?', ibid., notes that most SEZ foreign investments are less than $140,000. Deng Xiaoping reportedly told a visiting Algerian delegation that Shenzhen was a pilot project whose success remained to be proved while Hu Qiaomu specifically critised it for false accounting books and foreign business practices; The Australian, 2 July 1985.

30. Madelyn C. Ross, 'China's New-Old Investment Zones', ibid.

31. David Richter, 'Investment Projects in China', ibid. The compilation is derived from provincial lists but presented by economic sector, not location.

32. Beijing Review, Vol.28, No.22, 3 June 1985.

33. AWSJ, 25 July 1985.

34. ibid.

35. Kyodo in English from Peking, 11 May 1984, reports a 370-photo publication with a 50,000 word narrative covering

'Japanese atrocities' in China from 1894 to 1945, accompanied by an editorial postscript: 'While we strive to promote friendly relations with Japan we must also guard against the backlash of a possible revival of Japanese militarism.' See JPRS-CEA-84-044, p.18.

36. Chae-jin Lee, China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984) draws on interviews with highly placed Chinese and Japanese, in addition to close research, to detail the Baoshan steel story. The $4.5 billion project with an annual 3 million ton capacity was scheduled to be in production by September 1985; The International Herald Tribune, 27 May 1985.

37. Deng Liqun, 'One Appeal, One Plea', Speech to the First Annual Academic Convention of the Historical Society and the Opening of the Third Congress of Historical Circles', Renmin ribao, 6 June 1983; see also Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), China, 14 June 1983, pp.K 9-12.

38. Allen S. Whiting, 'Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy', Asian Survey, Vol.23, No.8, August 1983, recounts the Chinese reaction to these matters in some detail.

39. Deng Xiaoping to the Twelfth Congress of the CCP, 1 September 1982, in Beijing Review, 6 September 1982.

40. Hu Yaobang to the Twelfth Congress of the CCP, 1 September 1982, in Beijing Review, 13 September 1982.

41. Pai Hsing (Hong Kong), No.52, 16 July 1983 in FBIS, 21 July 1983, cited in Chalmers Johnson, 'The Mouse-Trapping of Hong Kong: A Game in which Nobody Wins', Asian Survey, Vol.24, No.9, September 1984.

42. Deng raised the possibility of blockade in two separate interviews in the autumn of 1984; one Japanese, the other Chinese-American (the latter communicated privately to the author). Hu spoke of using force in seven to ten years 'if the broad masses of the Taiwan people wish to return and a small number do not'. See interview of 10 May 1985 in Pai

Hsing, No.97, 1 June 1985, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/7970/C/1, 6 June 1985.

43. Robert Delfs, 'Saving to Spend', FEER, 27 June 1985, reports cutbacks in imports designed to reduce the emerging trade deficit and sudden decline in foreign reserves, both manifest in late 1984-early 1985 figures. See Ye Caiwen and Wang Shouxi, 'On the Balance of Trade and the Utilization of Foreign Funds', Guoji maoyi wenti, No.6, 15 December 1983, in JPRS-CEA-84-074, pp.82-92: 'In the present stage it is appropriate to maintain an unfavorable balance of trade within appropriate limits', arguing against standard practice.

44. Bo Tao, 'On "Northward" and "Southward" Strategy - Initial Probing of Developing China's Capital Cooperation with Foreign Countries', Guangzhou yanjiu, [Guangzhou studies], No.1, 1985, in FBIS, 17 April 1985, K 8-14. Bo was in the Finance Research Office of the Head Office of the Bank of China. This detailed and sophisticated analysis attacked SEZs as too confining and limited, arguing instead for 'boldly selling part of our natural resources and market capacity to foreign investors and letting the exclusively foreign-invested enterprises have an impact on the national industry'. In addition, 'We must regard developing regional economic co-operation as our basic national policy ... China can establish mechanisms for settling international accounts with its trading partners (including multilateral and bilateral mechanisms) ... in the Pacific rim region.'

THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON LECTURE IN ETHNOLOGY

The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by Chinese residents in Australia and others in honour of the late Dr G.E. Morrison, a native of Geelong, Victoria, Australia.

The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to honour for all time the memory of a great Australian who rendered valuable services to China, and to improve cultural relations between China and Australia. The foundation of the lectureship had the official support of the Chinese Consulate-General and was due in particular to the efforts of Mr William Liu, merchant, of Sydney; Mr William Ah Ket, barrister, of Melbourne; Mr F.J. Quinlan and Sir Colin MacKenzie, of Canberra. From the time of its inception until 1948 the lecture was associated with the Australian Institute of Anatomy, but in the latter year the responsibility for the management of the lectureship was taken over by the Australian National University, and the lectures delivered since that date have been given under the auspices of the University.

The following lectures have been delivered:

Inaugural: W.P. Chen, The Objects of the Foundation of the Lectureship and a review of Dr Morrison's Life in China. 10 May 1932.

Second: W. Ah Ket, Eastern Thought, with More Particular Reference to Confucius. 3 May 1933.

Third: J.S. MacDonald, The History and Development of Chinese Art. 3 May 1934.

Fourth: W.P. Chen, The New Culture Movement in China. 10 May 1935.

Fifth: Wu Lien-teh, Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and Chinese Abroad. 2 September 1936.*

Sixth: Chun-jien Pai, China Today: With Special Reference to Higher Education. 4 May 1937.*

Seventh: A.F. Barker, The Impact of Western Industrialism on China. 17 May 1939.

Eighth: S.H. Roberts, The Gifts of the Old China to the New. 5 June 1939.

Ninth: Howard Mowll, West China as Seen Through the Eyes of the Westerner. 29 May 1940.

Tenth: W.G. Goddard, The Ming Shen. A Study in Chinese Democracy. 5 June 1941.

Eleventh: D.B. Copland, The Chinese Social Structure. 27 September 1948.

Twelfth: J.K. Rideout, Politics in Medieval China. 28 October 1949.

Thirteenth: C.P. FitzGerald, The Revolutionary Tradition in China. 19 March 1951.

Fourteenth: H.V. Evatt, Some Aspects of Morrison's Life and Work. 4 December 1952.

Fifteenth: Lord Lindsay of Birker, China and the West. 20 October 1953.

Sixteenth: M. Titiev, Chinese Elements in Japanese Culture. 27 July 1954.

Seventeenth: H. Bielenstein, Emperor Kuang-Wu (A.D.25-27) and the Northern Barbarians. 2 November 1955.*

Eighteenth: Leonard B. Cox, The Buddhist Temples of Yun-Kang and Lung-Men. 17 October 1956.

Nineteenth: Otto P.N. Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, The Chinese Civil Service. 4 November 1957.

Twentieth: A.R. Davies, The Narrow Lane: Some Observations on the Recluse in Traditional Chinese Society. 19 November 1958.

Twenty-first: C.N. Spinks, The Khmer Temple of Prah Vihar. 6 October 1959.

Twenty-second: Chen Chih-mai, Chinese Landscape Painting: The Golden Age. 5 October 1960.

Twenty-third: L. Carrington Goodrich, China's Contacts with Other Parts of Asia in Ancient Times. 1 August 1961.*

Twenty-fourth: N.G.D. Malmqvist, Problems and Methods in Chinese Linguistics. 22 November 1962.*

Twenty-fifth: H.F. Simon, Some Motivations of Chinese Foreign Policy. 3 October 1963.

Twenty-sixth: Wang Ling, Calendar, Cannon and Clock in the Cultural Relations between Europe and China. 18 November 1964.

Twenty-seventh: A.M. Halpern, Chinese Foreign Policy - Success or Failure? 9 August 1966.*

Twenty-eighth: J.W. de Jong, Buddha's Word in China. 18 October 1967.*

Twenty-ninth: J.D. Frodsham, New Perspectives in Chinese Literature. 23 July 1968.*

Thirtieth: E.A. Huck, The Assimilation of the Chinese in Australia. 6 November 1969.*

Thirty-first: K.A. Wittfogel, Agriculture: A Key to the Understanding of Chinese Society, Past and Present. 6 April 1970.*

Thirty-second: I. de Rachewiltz, Prester John and Europe's Discovery of East Asia. 3 November 1971.*

Thirty-third: Eugene Kamenka, Marx, Marxism and China. 6 September 1972.

Thirty-fourth: Liu Ts'un-yan, On the Art of Ruling a Big Country: Views of Three Chinese Emperors. 13 November 1973.*

Thirty-fifth: Jerome Ch'en, Peasant Activism in Contemporary China. 22 July 1974.

Thirty-sixth: Yi-fu Tuan, Chinese Attitudes to Nature: Idea and Reality. 3 September 1975.

Thirty-seventh: Lo Hui-Min, The Tradition and Prototypes of the China-Watcher. 27 October 1976.*

Thirty-eighth: Roy Hofheinz, People, Places and Political in Modern China. 17 August 1977.

Thirty-ninth: Mark Elvin, Self-Liberation and Self-Immolation in Modern Chinese Thought. 13 September 1978.*

Fortieth: Wang Gungwu, Power, Rights and Duties in Chinese History. 19 September 1979.*

Forty-first: Dr Fang Chao-ying, The Great Wall of China: Keeping out or Keeping In? 5 June 1980.

Forty-second: T'ien Ju-K'ang, Moslem Rebellion in China: A Yunnan Controversy. 17 June 1981.*

Forty-third: Alan Thorne, China and Australia: Forty Thousand Years of Contact. 4 August 1982.

Forty-fourth: Chan Hok-lam, Control of Publishing in China, Past and Present. 24 August 1983.*

Forty-fifth: J.S. Gregory, The Chinese and Their Revolutions. 8 August 1984.*

Forty-sixth: Allen S. Whiting, China and the World: Independence v Dependence. 31 July 1985.*

* Available from Contemporary China Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies.